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Case No. 20080772-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
"kick-k 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Traffic Stop Did Not De-Escalate as to Harding 
The State argues that in light of the factors proposed in State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, 63 P.3d 650, that the seizure de-escalated to a consensual encounter (Appellee Br. at 
7-12). While Harding agrees that Hansen guides the analysis as to whether a traffic stop 
de-escalated, the State misapplies its principles as to Harding. It is well-settled law that 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when officers effect a traffic stop they seize both 
the driver of the vehicle and its passengers, "even though the purpose of the stop is 
limited and the resulting detention is quite brief." Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 
255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2406, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). 
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Because Harding, as a passenger, was seized under the Fourth Amendment, the 
analysis in Hansen must be applied to Harding to consider whether the seizure dissipated. 
Harding asserts that the factors in Hansen clearly indicate that Officer Westerman 
unlawfully detained Harding. 
In determining whether the seizure de-escalated to a consensual encounter, the 
State addresses several factors in Hansen as applied to the driver (Appellee Br. at 9-10). 
The State, however, fails to address how these factors affect the analysis as to Harding. 
Whether this Court determines that the encounter de-escalated as to the driver is 
irrelevant; the analysis as to Harding is independent. Because Harding was 
unequivocally seized as a passenger by the traffic stop, the specifics of the encounter 
between the officers and Harding are determinative of whether the stop de-escalated. 
A. Under Hansen, Officer Westerman Unlawfully Seized Harding 
"A traffic stop de-escalates to a consensual encounter when a reasonable person 
would believe, based on the totality of the circumstances, that he or she is free to end the 
encounter and depart." Hansen, 2002 UT at \ 39. "If a reasonable person would not 
believe he or she is free to leave or disregard questioning, however, the encounter 
remains an investigatory detention." Hansen, 2002 UT at ]f 39. "An evaluation of the 
totality of the circumstances is a fact-intensive inquiry" and the Hansen factors further 
that inquiry. United States v. Thompson, 546 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2008). 
Although the ultimate question is whether a reasonable person would feel free to 
leave or disregard questioning, several factors guide the analysis. See, Hansen, 2002 UT 
at Tf 39. In Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court listed several factors to consider when 
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determining whether a person would feel free to leave or disregard questioning: (1) 
whether documents were returned to the person; (2) whether the person was told they 
were free to leave; (3) whether a "coercive show of authority" exists, such as the presence 
of more than one officer, the display of a weapon, physical touching by the officer, or use 
of commanding tone of voice. Hansen, 2002 UT at ^  40-41. 
First, the threshold factor was satisfied, in that the officer did not possess 
Harding's documents which would prevent her from leaving the scene. Hansen, 2002 UT 
at ^ f 40. But as only a threshold issue, it is not dispositive. 
Second, in Hansen, the arresting officer did not inform Hansen "that he was free to 
leave or that he did not have to answer [] additional questions." Hansen, 2002 UT at Tf 
45. This caused the Utah Supreme Court to question whether a reasonable person would 
feel free to leave if they were not told they could do so. Hansen, 2002 UT at ^ j 45-46. 
Similarly, here, Officer Westerman never told Harding that she was free to leave. 
After stopping the vehicle, Officer Westerman spoke with the driver and asked her to exit 
the vehicle (R. 112: 7, 15-19). Officer Westerman issued a citation and told the driver 
she was free to leave (R. 112: 7, 15-19). During this encounter, however, Officer 
Westerman and the driver were outside of the vehicle and Harding was not privy to this 
conversation. Also, Officer Westerman testified that he never told Harding that she was 
free to leave (R. 112: 14, 10-15). 
Furthermore, as the United States Supreme Court emphasized in Brendlin, a 
passenger would not, on his own, conclude that he was free to walk away from a traffic 
stop because "his attempt to leave the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an 
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objection from the officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place." 
Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257. Because Harding was unaware that the seizure had 
terminated, and a reasonable person would not feel free to leave under the circumstances, 
this weighs heavily in Harding's favor that she was seized. 
Third, courts should consider whether there was a show of authority, which would 
cause a reasonable person to believe they were not free to leave. See, Hansen, 2002 UT 
at Tf 41. Here, like in Hansen, the presence of more than one officer in this case weighs in 
the favor of a continued seizure. See, Hansen, 2002 UT at f 44. In this case Officer 
Westerman called Officer Lasenby for assistance (R. 112: 15). Officer Lasenby arrived 
to the scene before the encounter between Officer Westerman and the driver concluded 
(R. 112: 14-15). Furthermore, Officer Lasenby remained at the scene and watched the 
passengers during the search of the vehicle (R. 43). Thus, Officer Lasenby's arrival after 
the stop was effected by Officer Westerman would cause a reasonable person to believe 
"that the encounter was escalating rather than de-escalating." Hansen, 2002 UT at f 44. 
Also, the fact that Officer Westerman asked the passengers to exit the car would 
cause a reasonable person to believe they were still seized and not free to leave. After the 
purpose of the stop had concluded, Officer Westerman claims to have received consent to 
search the vehicle (R. 112: 14). At this point, none of the passengers were aware of their 
status because Officer Westerman and the driver were speaking outside of the vehicle (R. 
112: 14). It was not until Officer Westerman wanted to search the vehicle that Harding 
was told what was going on. At that point, Officer Westerman, with Officer Lasenby 
close by, asked the passengers to exit the vehicle (R. 112: 15). Although there is no 
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indication that Officer Westerman used a commanding tone, Officer Westerman 
nonetheless issued an order which would indicate to a reasonable person that they were 
being detained. 
Moreover, Officer Westerman stated to the passengers "if they wanted to wait 
with [Officer Lasenby], while I took a look in the vehicle" (R. 112: 15). At the very 
least, this ambiguous statement by Officer Westerman would lead a reasonable person, 
under the circumstances, to believe that they needed to stand by the other officer while he 
conducted a search. If this was not so, the officer could have told them they were free to 
leave. Cf. Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257 (a reasonable person would not feel free to leave a 
traffic stop because of the obvious objection from the officer). 
Considering these facts under the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that 
Harding, a passenger, would not have felt free to leave the scene. See, Hansen, 2002 UT 
at Tf 39. Because the purpose of the stop had concluded and the officers did not have 
independent cause to detain Harding as they did, her seizure was illegal. Stee, Hansen, 
2002 UT at H 31. 
II. The Need to Control the Scene Does Not Necessitate Harding's Detention 
The State contends that the officers were justified in detaining Harding because 
there was farther need to control the scene (Appellee Br. at 12-13). The State's position 
does two things: First, it concedes that Harding was detained without particularized 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See, Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 
124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). And, second, it conflicts with the principle that: 
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Once the purpose of the initial stop is concluded, however, the person must 
be allowed to depart. 'Any further temporary detention for investigative 
questioning after [fulfilling] the purpose for the initial traffic stop' 
constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion of a further illegality. 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, If 31; accord, State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 654-55 
(Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
First, the State's position, under this issue, conceeds the officers did not have at 
least reasonable suspicion to detain Harding beyond the traffic stop. A traffic stop is a 
level-two encounter which is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Hansen, 2002 UT 
at 135. Because it is a seizure, only when "specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime" may 
an officer detain the person for investigative purposes. Hansen, 2002 UT at ^ f 35 (quoting 
United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations 
omitted). The State does not claim that the officers had at least reasonable suspicion to 
detain Harding. As such, the detention was unlawful. 
Second, and closely related, the State's argument conflicts with well-settled law. 
Here, the State does not contend that the officers had an independent suspicion to justify 
Harding's further detention. Rather, the State relies on this theory that officer that 
permission to conduct a search of vehicle necessarily creates "further need to control the 
scene" (Appellee Br. at 13) (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. , 129 S.Ct. 781, 
788, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009)). 
Here, the State's contention that a search necessitates police to "control the scene" 
which justifies detaining persons at the scene for their safety (Appellee Br. at 13). The 
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holding in Johnson does not reach that conclusion. Johnson addressed "the authority of 
officers to 'stop and frisk' a passenger in a motor vehicle temporarily seized upon police 
detection of traffic infraction." Johnson, 129 S.Ct. at 784. In Johnson, the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that the Terry frisk performed on Johnson, a passenger in a 
vehicle, was lawful because it was reasonable under the circumstances. Johnson, 129 
S.Ct. at 784. These facts, however, are different. 
Presently, the State contorts the holding in Johnson to support its position that the 
officers were justified in controlling the scene in order to conduct the search safely 
(Appellee Br. at 13). By this logic it follows that in order to "control" the scene officers 
must detain persons in the area. This is not necessarily so. As held in Hansen, 
passengers are detained unless facts indicate otherwise. Hansen, 2002 UT at ^  37. And 
unless there is some independent suspicion, particularized to that person, the officers 
have no reason to further detain a passenger, especially when the search is, as the State 
asserts, a consensual search. 
The State contends that "[a]ny other rule would unnecessarily jeopardize officer 
safety" (Appellee Br. at 13). While officer safety is a concern, that alone does not justify 
further detention. Here, Officer Westerman had the option of releasing the passengers 
and then conducting the search without fearing for his safety. Because Officer Lasenby 
was there to assist, he could have watched the passengers leave the scene to protect from 
any perceived danger - which the officers never indicated even existed during the stop. 
Therefore, it is unnecessary to find that officers can categorically detain persons when 
they subjectively believe there is a "further need to control the scene." Such a conclusion 
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starkly conflicts with the Utah Supreme Courts holding in Hansen. See, Hansen, 2002 
UTat l31 . 
III. By Stipulation and According to the Trial Court, Harding Has Standing to 
Challenge the Search of the Vehicle 
Regardless of the State's legal position on whether Harding has standing to 
challenge the search of the vehicle, trial counsel's stipulation and the trial court's 
acceptance of that stipulation are indisputable. While Harding agrees with the general 
principle cited by the State that u[a] defendant may not invoke the exclusionary rule, even 
where an unreasonable search has occurred, unless she has a 'legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place[,]'" the State has conceded otherwise. (Appellee Br. at 14) 
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). 
As clearly illustrated in Judge Laycock's ruling on the matter, the State stipulated 
and the trial court acknowledged that Harding has standing to challenge the vehicle 
search. After considerable briefing of the issue, the trial court's ruling on Harding's 
motion to suppress states: "the State has acknowledged and the court finds that Ms. 
Harding has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the vehicle search because she 
had a reasonable expectation to privacy in her bags and she never abandoned them." (R. 
74) (emphasis added). Thus, Harding does have standing to argue the validity of the 
vehicle search. 
Furthermore, the State cannot now switch sides and argue that Harding did not 
have standing because it has waived that issue. In State v. Schlosser, the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected the State's argument regarding the defendant's standing. In Schlosser, the 
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Court stated that "[s]ince the issue of Schlosser's standing to challenge the officer's 
search has not been raised by the State, it has been waived and is not properly before us." 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1139 (Utah 1989); see also. State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 
15, ^1, 113 P.3d 551 ("Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made 
in order to preserve an issue for appeal"). 
Similarly here, the State failed to dispute Judge Laycock's stipulated finding that 
Harding indeed had standing to challenge the vehicle search. As such, the State is bound 
by this finding and cannot now claim otherwise. Therefore, Harding renews her 
arguments regarding the unconstitutionality of the vehicle search.1 
IV. Officer Westerman's Search of Harding's Bags Was Unconstitutional 
Because it was Objectively Unreasonable 
The State asserts that a consensual "search is valid even in instances where the 
third party does not possess common authority, as long as [officers] 'reasonably believe' 
that the third party possess such authority." (Appellee Br. at 17) (quoting State v. 
Messer, 2007 UT App 166, Tj 21, 164 P.3d 421). The key to whether such a search is 
valid turns on the reasonableness of the officer's belief. Here, Westerman's belief was 
objectively unreasonable and the trial court erred in holding otherwise. 
Here, it is undisputed that Harding has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her 
bags. (R. 75) (Appellee Br. at 16). And, Harding never consented to the search of her 
bags. The issue is whether it was reasonable for Officer Westerman to believe that the 
driver had common authority over the bags to give consent. Harding asserts that it was 
1
 See, Appellant Brief at 6-17. 
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unreasonable for Westerman to believe that the driver could consent to the search of the 
bags. 
The State relies on State v. Messer to show that consent given by a third party to 
search another's belongings is valid when the officers believe that the third party 
possesses common authority over the item searched. (Appllee Br. at 17-18). Messer, 
however, is clearly distinguishable. 
In Messer, police suspected the defendant and his girlfriend, Karen Hardy, of 
producing methamphetamine. Messer, 2007 UT App 166,f2. After the defendant and 
Hardy were arrested for parole violations, Hardy provided police with information that 
the methamphetamine lab was located on the property of a third party, Tim Hasch. 
Messer, 2007 UT App 166, Tf 3-4. Police visited Hasch and he gave the officers 
permission to search a vehicle located on his property. Id. at ]f 4. Police searched the 
vehicle's trunk and found several bags. Id. at Tf 4. Hasch informed police that the bags 
belonged to defendant and that defendant also had a key to the vehicle. Id. at ]f 4. Then, 
without objection from Hasch, police searched the contents of the bags and discovered 
materials for methamphetamine production. Id. at 1} 4. The case went to trial and Messer 
was convicted of unlawful possession of laboratory equipment, but subsequently 
appealed his conviction, claiming in part that his trial counsel was ineffective. Id. at ^ f 4. 
On appeal, this Court considered whether "Hasch's consent to search the car was 
insufficient to allow the search of the Defendant's bags stored in the trunk's car." 
Messer, 2007 UT App 166,120. Based on the principle that "[i]f a third party rather 
than the defendant consents to a search, the third party must be one who possesses 
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'common authority' over the area or has some other 'sufficient relationship to the 
premises or effects sought to be inspected[,]'" this Court found the search of defendant's 
bag was valid. Id. at ^  21-23 (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992)). 
This Court found the search valid for two reasons: (1) "common authority does not 
require ownership[;]" and (2) by "leaving the bags in Hasch's car on Hasch's property, 
Defendant took the risk that Hasch might not maintain Defendant's privacy interest in the 
bags." Messer, 2007 UT App 166, ^  22. Although Harding concedes that in a third-party 
consent search issue possession, not ownership, is sufficient, the key to the analysis is 
whether it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that the driver had the 
power to consent to the search of Harding's bags. 
In considering the reasonableness of this officer's reliance, this Court should 
consider it under the totality of the circumstances and under an objective standard. The 
United States Supreme Court found that: 
[a]s with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, 
determination of consent to enter must 'be judged against an objective 
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment... warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had 
authority over the [property]? If not, then [a] warrantless [search] without 
further inquiry is unlawful .... 
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 
(1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968)). There are a few reasons why the officer's reliance on the driver's consent 
to search the bags was unreasonable and therefore, distinguishable from Messer. 
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Presently, because there were four people present in the vehicle, it would be 
objectively unreasonable for the officer to assume that the driver's consent, alone, 
would cover a search of the bags in the vehicle. In Messer, this Court found that 
because defendant left his bags in Hasch's vehicle, he "took the risk that Hasch 
might not maintain [his] privacy interest in the bags." Messer, 2007 UT App 166, 
If 22. Harding contends that that conclusion heavily relies on the fact that Messer 
as not present at the scene, as opposed to being present during the search, as 
Harding was in this case. 
Here, Harding was present during the search. Before Officer Westerman 
searched the vehicle Harding was told to "step out of the vehicle" and she waited 
with Officer Lasenby while he conducted the search (R. 112: 15). As opposed to 
Messer, where the defendant was not present with the third-party consenter, 
Harding was close by. In Messer, the vehicle was on Hasch's property and only 
Hasch was present when the search was conducted. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, | 
4. Because only Hasch was present and the vehicle was on his property, it would 
be reasonable for the officer's to believe that Hasch had power to consent to the 
search of the vehicle and its contents. 
Presently, however, Harding was in the vehicle and remained close by 
throughout the encounter. Because Harding was present, a reasonable person 
would conclude that the bags may not belong to the driver. In fact, because there 
were four passengers in the vehicle - Harding, the driver, and two others (R. 112: 
5) - a reasonable person would be further compelled to believe that the bags may 
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have belonged to somebody other than the driver. There was only a 1 in 4 or 25% 
chance that the driver had power to consent to the bag search. 25% is not 
reasonable. 
Moreover, the nature of the bag and its location would indicate it may have 
belonged to someone other than the driver. At the preliminary hearing, Officer 
Westerman described where the bags were found: "[d]irectly behind the rear 
passenger seat there is a small space for storage, and directly behind where Ms. 
Harding was seated ..." (R. 112: 16, 6-8). Officer Westerman also testified that he 
"recalled seeing a black purse-type thing that cam out of one of the backpacks" (R. 
112: 16, 20-22). And that inside this "black purse-type thing" officers found the 
contraband attributed to Harding (R. 116: 16-17). Because the driver, who was 
female, was not the only female in the car, a reasonable person would believe that 
the "black purse-type thing" could have belonged to either the driver or Harding, 
who is also female (R. 112: 5, 7-11). Furthermore, the fact that the bag containing 
the purse was located "directly behind [Harding,]" would substantiate, in the mind 
of a reasonable person, that the bags belonged to someone other than the driver. 
The State cites State v. Maristany, 627 A.2d 1066 (N.J. 1993), a case from the 
New Jersey Supreme Court, for the proposition that "[w]hile it may be 'better law 
enforcement practice.. .for police officers to specifically inquire and attempt to ascertain 
ownership of luggage in a vehicle with several occupants, rather than to rely on the 
driver's consent to search,' the Fourth Amendment does not require it." (Appellee Br. at 
20) (quoting Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070) (citation omitted in Appellee brief). Although 
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Maristany may be somewhat persuasive, it is not controlling and the United States 
Supreme Court has not addressed this issue. Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
delineates the split in authority among the federal courts regarding this issue. See, 
Maristany, 627 A.2d at 306-07 (recognizing some federal courts have determined that a 
driver's authority to consent to a search of a car does not necessarily authorize police to 
search every container within the car). And true, while the Fourth Amendment does not 
expressly require officers to make specific inquiries to ascertain ownership of property, 
Harding asserts it is implicitly required. 
"[Reasonableness is 'the touchstone of the constitutionality of a government 
search.'" State v. Moreno, 2009 UT 15, f 22, 203 P.3d 1000, 1009 (quoting Board of 
Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 753 (2002)). As 
such, the analysis under these circumstances is whether Officer Westerman reasonably 
believed, under an objective standard, that the driver had authority to consent to the bag 
search. See, Messer, 2007 UT App 166,1f 21. And whether it is a "better law 
enforcement practice" or not, is not the real issue. Maristany, 627 A.2d at 1070. The real 
issue is whether it was reasonable. See, (Appellee Br. at 20); Maristany, 627 A.2d at 
1070 ("The validity of the search does not depend on whether the officer used the best 
procedure, but rather on whether the officer's conduct was objectively reasonable under 
the circumstances."). Was it reasonable for Officer Westerman, in light of all the 
circumstances that indicate otherwise, to believe that the driver's consent included a 
search of the bags? Harding insists it was not, and that the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness standard implicitly required Officer Westerman to inquire as to the 
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ownership of the bags. See, Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188 (holding that even when a person 
gives permission to search property, "the surrounding circumstances could conceivably 
be such that a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further 
inquiry."). 
Unlike Messer, where the defendant was not present when the search was 
conducted and under the totality of the circumstances it may have been reasonable for the 
officers to believe the consent given covered the items in the vehicle too, Harding 
presence, along with three other individuals, the location of the bag and the fact that the 
container was purse-like, would indicate to the objectively, reasonable person that the 
driver's consent to search the vehicle did not include the bags. Therefore, Westerman 
should have inquired further for clarification. 
V. Officer Westerman's Search Exceeded the Scope of the Driver's Consent 
to Search Only the Vehicle 
Passengers in vehicles have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their own 
belongings located on their person and in the vehicle. See, Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 
U.S. 295, 303, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 1302, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999); see also. State v. Frank, 
650 N.W.2d 213, 218-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) ("We conclude that the cases holding 
that a driver's consent to search a motor vehicle does not extend to property owned by 
passengers who are present and available to consent to the search of their property are 
more consistent with constitutional limits on warrantless searches than the cases that 
conclude otherwise"). Thus, when Officer Westerman exceeded the scope of the search 
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consented to by the driver, he unlawfully infringed on Harding's legitimate expectation 
of privacy. 
The State relies on Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 
297 (1991), for the proposition that "the Fourth Amendment does not require an officer to 
identify the object of his search, or to reveal why he is requesting consent to search" 
(Appellee Br. at 20). In Jimeno, however, the Court also stated, and the State 
acknowledges, that "[t]he scope of consent is usually defined by its expressed object." 
(Appellee Br. at 20) (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251) (emphasis added). These two 
statements seem to conflict. 
In Jimeno, the United States Supreme Court held that "[a] suspect may of course 
delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents. But if his consent 
would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container, the Fourth 
Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more explicit authorization." Jimeno, 
500 U.S. at 251. This is based on the fact that the officer informed Jimeno that he 
believed he was carrying narcotics. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. As such, the Court 
concluded that "it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general 
consent to search respondent's car included consent to search containers within that car 
which might bear drugs." Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. That is not the case here, however. 
First, there is no specified object of the search. The Court in Jimeno stated that 
scope of the search is defined by the object of the search. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251. Here, 
there is no object of the search; so, as the State would have it, Officer Westerman did not 
limit himself as the officer did in Jimeno by indicating the object of the search. But to 
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agree with the State only expands the scope of searches because officers will not be 
inclined to identify what they are looking for. Rather, officers will exploit consent 
searches by not limiting the scope by declaring what it is they are looking for. Harding 
contends this goes against Jimeno and the spirit of the Fourth Amendment protection to 
be free from unreasonable searches. 
Here, Officer Westerman should have at least identified what contraband he 
suspected was in the car. And it only makes sense that he suspected contraband was in 
the vehicle or else he would not have asked to search it. By identifying what he is 
searching for, the person giving consent will at least be put on notice regarding where the 
government will be intruding. 
Second, Officer Westerman's search went beyond the consent give because the 
driver gave consent only to search in the vehicle, not inside all the containers inside the 
vehicle. (R. 112: 7-8). Officer Westerman testified that after the driver came back up to 
him, he "asked if [he] could take a look in the vehicle." (R. 112: 7-8). A reasonable 
person would take this to mean that the officer could look anywhere inside the vehicle -
the glove compartment, under the seats or the floor mats, and even in those little coin 
holders. What a reasonable person would not take it to mean is that the officer had 
consent to search inside the car and inside any closed containers not a part of the car -
e.g., Harding's bag. 
Under the circumstances, Officer Westerman should have clarified the scope of his 
search or sought additional permission. If the driver's consent was valid and Westerman 
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could search the interior of the vehicle, once he discovered the bags he should have either 
asked for permission to search containers inside the vehicle in the first place or sought. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse 
the denial of her motion to suppress and vacate her convictions, and remand this case to 
the Fourth District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4TH day of September, 2009. 
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